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SOME REMARKS ABOUT PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS FOR 
THE NECESSITY OF DIALOGUE AS A CONDITION FOR 
HUMAN EXISTENCE 
by Krystyna Gorniak 
Dr. Krystyna Gorniak i s  a university lecturer in phi losophy 
a t  the Adam Mi ck i e w i cz Unive r s i ty in Poznan , P o l and.  Her 
art i cle , "Dialogue - -A New Utopia?" was pub l i shed in  OPREE, 
Vo l. VI , No.  5. She has a t t ended the Ch r i s t i a n - Ma r x i s t  
Dialogue in Insbruck,  Aus tria,  in Augus t  1987 , a s  wel l  a s  a 
number of phi l osophical  conferen ce s  in Europe and the U.S.A. 
C z e s raw Mi lo s z ,  the Nobe l -p r i z e  w inne r ,  s a id in an i n t e rv i e w :  
" I n  m y  book .!!!� �!!!.� £i !:!!..!£ I com pared what  happened i n  t h e  e ight ­
eenth century with taking the wrong subway train in New York. You can 
go in a wrong d ire ction somewhere. You go very far and can' t get off. 
Maybe we've been on the wrong train" (Mi l:osz/Gardele s ,  1986).  
The fe e l ing of a need t o  find "the r i gh t  t ra in"1 chara ct e r i z e s , 
among others , twentieth- century phenomenolog i s t s  and phi losophers of 
r e la t ed o r i en t a t i on s ,  s u ch a s  exi s t en t i a l i s t s .  Th i s  w a s  e v i d e n t  in 
the i r  at te m p t  t o  f ind the ba s i c  ph i l o s o ph i ca l  que s t ion wh i ch would  
perm it a return to the sources  of phi losophizing. For Edmund Hus serl 
the prob lem of "the pos s ib i l ity to take a genuine ly first s t ep" (Hus­
s e r l , 1 9 8 2, 1 9 )  is  one o f  t h e  fundamen t a l  p r ob l em s .  Th i s  p r ob l em 
involves "the question as  the prob lem of the point of departure about 
first cogni t ions whi ch would have to and whi ch could make the founda­
t i on for the en t i re  h i e r a r ch i ca l  s t r u cture  o f  un ive r s a l  cogn i t i on" 
(Hu s s e r l, 1 98 2, 20) . The e s s en ce of the prob lem w a s  formu l a t e d  by 
Karl Jaspers in thi s  way: '�hi losophy began w i th a quest ion: What is  
there ? Hen ce ,  f i r s t  o f  a l l ,  there  a r e  v a r i o u s  be ing s , t h ings  in the 
world ,  inan ima te and an imate beings , infinitely numerous ,  everything 
a p pe a r i n g  and d i s ap p e a r ing .  Howeve r ,  what  is  t rue b e in g , t h a t  i s ,  
b e ing wh i ch bond s a ll wh i ch l ie s  a t  the found a t i on o f  a l l  and f rom 
wh i ch all that exi s t s  results?"  (Jaspers,  1 9 7 1 ,  24). 
An na-T e r e s a  Tym i en i e cka , one of the b e t t e r  known con tempora ry 
Polish phenomenologi s t s ,  takes a pos i t ion whi ch also  deal s  w ith one of 
the a b s o lu t e ly fundamen t a l  ph i l o s oph i ca l  que s t i on s  and r e l a t e s  not 
only to the character of real ity in whi ch we e x i s t ,  whi l e  being at  the 
same t ime ! part of i t , 2 but a l s�t� the way we cognize thi s  real ity. 
In her opinion ,  the human being i s  the most characteri s t i c  case of a 
real ind ividual among a l l  exis tences.  Having a ll the features common 
for him/her and all other beings , the human being i s  not only e x cep­
t i on a l  in that  s h e /he  i s  an ob s e rv e r  sugge s t in g  unde r  r e f l e ct ion a 
w o r ld s u r round ing h i m /h e r ,  but  a l s o  tha t s h e / h e  i s  i t s  co - cr e a t o r .  
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Hen ce , the human 
nev e r  be in the 
observe r. (See : 
being i s  involved in a dynami c  of accidents and can 
p o s it ion o f  "an i d e a l  o b s e rv e r, "  t h a t  i s  o n ly an 
Tymieniecka, 1972 , 2 04f. ) 
Tymieniecka asks then how and i f  our m ind i s  capable of g rasping 
and de s crib ing dynam ic, t rans ien t rea l i ty .  Are we n o t  cre a t i ng 
artificia l ,  s t a t i c  cons t ru ct ions whi ch a re not an adequate counterpa rt 
of the real world when we b ui ld images  o f  the wo rld,  when we describe 
it th rough an analys is  of individual s t ru cture s ?  
Rea l i ty  h a s  a dynam i c  cha ra ct e r  a n d  y e t  a t  t h e  s ame t im e ,  a s  
Tymieniecka points out ,  i t  has durat ion. "When we are astonished at 
rea l exis tence,  neithe r the variab i lity, mob i l i ty, no r becoming and 
vanis h ing of a b e in g  wh i ch i s  s t a t i c  in i t s  n a t u re a re the ob j e ct o f  
ou r a s t on i shmen t ,  but ,  conve rs e l y ,  the  s ub s i s t en ce o f  a rea l  th ing 
among the wave s o f  va riab i l i ty is wha t s e e m s  t o  puz z l e  u s "  ( Tym i e n ­
i e ck a ,  1 9 7 2 ,  2 03). Hen ce ,  in h e r  p e rs p e ct ive  i t  i s  n o t  a p rob lem o f  
the "either-or" cha racter but that o f  "as wel l  as." 
The f a ct that be ing i s  b o t h  dynam i c  and s t a t i c, t h a t  the plen i ­
tude of reality i s  dete rmined by recip rocal  relat ions and the intera c­
tion of those two features  whi ch constitute i t ,  imposes on phi losophy 
a task whi ch ,  in �ymienie cka' s  opinion ,  clas s i ca l  phenomenology could 
not hand le. "F rom fundamental rational i ty we have to move to inve sti ­
gat ions o f  accidental e xi stence. The nature o f  unpredi ctability which 
eide t i c  s t ructures were to consolidate now becomes a mat ter for atten­
t ion . . The advan t age s and re s t ri ct ion s o f  both  the s t ru ct u ra l  
and gene t i c  m e thod s requ i re an add endum b y  m e an s o f  a pre sumptive 
procedu re" (Tymieniecka , 1972 ,  2 03). The most spectacular example of 
accidental existence is the human being. 
Tymieniecka means that the rea l  ind i v i dua l a s  s u ch con s t i t u t e s  
not only the foundation whi ch shapes the center, but a l s o  a purposeful 
direct ing of the real world which also emerges from the unive rs a l  play 
o f  pow e rs .  On l y  t h rough a rea l  ob je ct a s  a re fe ren ce p o i n t . can t he 
human be ing g ra s p  the w o rld .  Thu s ,  a re a l  ob je ct doe s n o t  have  in 
itself  a complete exis tential foundation :  i t  does not originat e  f rom 
the conve rgen ce of pow e rs who s e  ope ra t i on i t  does  not  b ri n g  abou t .  
These powers a ct in acco rdance with a formal determined pattern ,  from 
reasons whi ch a re not internal reasons of the originating ob je ct . "It 
s e e m s  that  i n  o rd e r  to e xp l a in the pro ce s s  o f  the o ri g i n  o f  a rea l  
individual ,  i �  order to present i t s  final reasons , we mus t  pos tulate 
the existence of � unive rsal  order of being, w i thin whi ch the indivi ­
dual originates and developes" (Tymieniecka,  1972,  2 07) .  
The separation of unpredi ctable l inks from the real  causal nexus 
whi ch b inds each relatively isolated s t ru cture (e.g. , a human being) 
with other( s )  or  ob je ct(s )  in the world is a procedure whi ch permits ,  
according to the outs tand ing Pol i sh phenomen o l o g i s t  Roman I n g a rd e n ,  
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further inves t igation of the world, e.g. , by the natural sciences (cf. 
Ingarden , 1981 ,  422f.) .  Phi losophy , however,  un l ike science, doesn't  
d e s c r i b e  the w o r l d  un ivoca l ly and un i p l enary .  Hen c e ,  Ka r l  J a s pe r s , 
among others , wrote: '�or a man who believes in science , the worst i s  
th i s ,  tha t ph i l o s oph y d o e s  n o t  have any c ommon i m p o r t a n t  r e su l t s ,  
s ome th·ing ·  th at on e cou l d  know a �d b y  the s a me could  p o s s e s s  • • . .  
Look in g  for,the truth whi le not poss e s s ing i t  i s  the heart of phi loso­
phy . Phi l o s ophy m e an s :  t b  b e  on t h e  w ay" (Ja s p e r s ,  1 9 7 1, 9 -
1 3) .  
For J a s pe r s ,  ph i l o s ophy i s  the s earch  for th i s  what  one k dow s 
t h a t  i t  i s ,  but  d o e s  n o t  know � !!�.! i t  i s ,  t h a t  i s .  When what  i t  i ·s ,  
i s  known , i t  i s  n o  l onger  a m a t t e r  o f  c on c e rn for ph i l o s ophy - - i t  
becomes a matter of sc ientifi c  research. Tymieniecka writes : "If we 
consi d e r  the lack of ind i v i dua l s t ru c ture s wh i ch b e c ome apparen t  
th rough phenomeno l o g i c a l  analy s i s ,  w e  come a c ro s s  que s t i o n s  w h i ch 
s u r pa s s  the exp l a n a t ory power  o f  a n a ly s i s  a l one.  The s e  que s t ion s , 
aiming at the ob ject ives and final reasons of individual beings ,  are 
a r ranged in t o  a pa r t i c u l a r  p a t t ern.  . . . The a c t u a l  order  o f  the 
world is undoubted ly a matter for science" (Tymieniecka, 197 2 ,  208). 
La t e r  on Tym ien i e cka s t a t e s  that  th i s  r e s ea r ch r e su l t s  in the c l aim 
that the order of the world has an  unpredictab le and tran s itory char­
acter and that it  does not explain the origin or ob ject ives of be ings .  
I n  h e r  o p i n i on ,  th i s  r e s u l t s  in a n e ce s s i t y t o  un d e r t ake fur ther 
research on the Arch itectonic Design of the Cosmos , which is  poss ible 
given the app l icat ion of the conjectura l procedures Tymieniecka postu­
lates. '�ow the real ind ividual being, man and the world are seen in 
the new perspective of cosmic constitut ion ,  in which all former d imen­
s i on s o f  phenomen o l o g i c a l  r e s earch  c onverge , f i n d ing the i r  p roper 
s c a l e  a s  we l l  as new ways of a t temp t in g  an s w e r s  t o  que s t i on s  w h i ch 
have so far remained unanswered" (Tym ieniecka, 1972, 208).  
Ac c o rd ing t o  Tym i en i e cka , a number  of f a c t o r s  have c au s e d  the 
n e c e s s i t y t o  en t e r  a new pha s e  o f  ph i l o s ophy as pur sued f rom the 
standpoint of phenomenology. Among the most important are changes in 
the approach t o  many ph i l o s oph i c a l  prob l e m s  wh i ch have t aken p l ace 
s ince World War II ,  changes which, in a sense ,  were the result  of the 
W a r  (ma in l y  the prob l e m  o f  t h e  s i tua t i on o f  the human b e ing in the 
world). 
Classic  phenom ·enology, the phenomenology of Husser! and Ingarden, 
appeared to be too ones ided to take on the burden of inves t iga t ing the 
complex mul t iaspec tual problems of the contemporary human being and 
the con temporary world . " this  clas s i c  phenomenol ogical frame-
work i s  rooted in epis temological as sumptions determining the formula­
t i on of the m e thod . In  fa c t ,  the  open ing o f  new approach e s  t o  man 
w h i ch have appeared w i th i n  the phenomeno l o g i c a l  f i e l d recen t l y ,  a s  
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we l l  as  the m o s t  r e cen t t rend s o f  i d ea s r  a r e  a rad i ca l  r e a ct i on t o  
these epistemologi cal  assum ptions (Tymieniecka,  197 6 ,  383). However,  
according to Tymienie cka,  the rea ct i on aga in s t  phenomenology in i t s  
clas s i c  form resu l t s  not only from the internal development of this 
ph i l o s o ph i ca l  t r e n d , b u t  a ls o  f r o m  t he o v e r a l l  s i t u a t i on i n  
con t emporary s p i r i tu a l  cu l ture  w h i ch, a s  i s  b e com ing more  and more 
apparen t ,  inv o l v e s  g row ing oppos i t i on to the t o t a l  dom ina t i on o f  
reason over a l l  other human feature s .  
Th e end o f  t h e  n in e t eenth cen t u ry w a s  m a rk e d  b y  d e s pa i r  in  the 
omni potence of human w i sdom . Thi s  des pair i s  seen today as  a s t rong 
ant i rat iona l i s t  s t ream in the social s cience s ,  as wel l ·  as in everyday 
l ife , and even in the natural s cience s .  Even i f  the cri s i s  of Western 
cu l tu r e  i s  s een a s  a r e su l t  o f  the crea t i on o f  a consumer  s o ciety  in 
wh i ch peopl e  are g iven the i r  ind i v i dua l i ty ,  t h e i r  w i l l ,  and t he i r 
h a p pine s s ,  th i s  prob l em remains  in t a ct .  The con sumer  s o cie t y  i s  a 
result  of the development of technology, based on rat iona l i s t  phi loso­
phy and on the n a t u r a l  s ci en ce s .  In  t h i s  ca s e  as w e l l ,  ra t iona l i sm 
may be regarded as  "gu i l ty" of leading humanity down a b l ind al ley. 
The w o r l d  of t e chno l o gy in  wh i ch we now l ive w a s  cre a ted by 
people themselves.  The human being is the creator of thi s  world, even 
though he no longer u nd e r s t and s i t .  He a l s o n o  l onger  com pr e hend s  
nature, i.e . ,  the world apart from peo pl e . 3 Even act ion can n o  l onger 
be t a lked abou t : "The po s s ib i l i ty o f  produ cing s om e t h i n g ,  whi ch i s  
contained in technology, has developed- -not least  a s  a resu l t  of its 
success- - into a crucial  form of act ion : even in human relationsh i ps ,  
production replaces  action" (Kampi t s ,  198 1, 329f.) .  Thi s  i s  a l s o  one 
of the fundamental prob lems of contem porary humani ty. 
In Tymieni e cka's opinion a l l  these  elements  have caused a l l  the 
fundamental claims of phenomenology, i t s  "corners tone s , "  both those of 
Hus serl and those of Ingarden, to "seem out l ived ." Tymieniecka pro ­
poses : 
Replacing the ab stra ct ideal essences  w i th the notion of the 
"irreducible ,"  the comb ina t o r i a l  s y s t em o f  i n t en t i on a l i ty 
with the insight into various  orches trat i ons of man's func­
t i on s ,  and more  i m po r t an t l y ,  a ppro a ch in g  m an a s  the -re a l  
autonomous individual not in separation from but w i th in the 
con cre t e  con ca tena t i on of the a ct u a l  con t e xt o f  t h e  r e a l  
�orld, we have the contextual framework of reference approp­
r i a t e  t o  d o  j u s t i ce t o  th i s  new d imen s i on ,  w i thout in any 
way giving up the a cqu i s i tions of the cla ss i c  ones  (Tymien­
i e cka , 19 7 6 ,  38 7 ) .  
Tymieniecka pays a lot of attent ion to the poss ib i l i ty o f  cro s s ­
ing barriers between d ifferent e lements  of rea l i ty, d ifferent level s  
o f  human existence ,  and a l so the ques tion o f  changeab i li ty as  a foun-
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dat i on for these prob lems. Determinat i on of the k ind of interact i on 
b e t w e en the ca t e g or i e s  m en t i oned  ab ove (and ot h e r s  w h i ch I d o  n ot 
ment ion here) can bring us  cl oser to  the s olu t i on of one of the focal  
p r ob l em s of the ex i s t en ce of con t e m p or a ry human b e in g ,  i . e . , the  
probl em of freed om. 
Roman Ingarden s tri ct ly conne cted the prob l em of freed om with the 
que s t i on of responsibil ity and thi s ,  in turn , is connected w i th hu man 
a ct ing. The re lat i on fol l ow s  from how Ingarden unders tands the idea 
of "a ct i on . "  Act i on i s  n ot f or h i m  an "exp e r i en ce , "  in any cas e  not  
such an "act i on" whi ch the human being is  respon s ib l e  for. I t  mus t  be  
"a  r e a l  a ct in g  i n  a r e a l w or l d ; it  mu s t  a l s o  b e  fu l f i l l ed by a r e a l  
man with a determined character" ( Ingarden , 1987 , 1 2 0). The connec­
t i on of the problem of responsibil i ty (and gui l t )  and act i on fulfil led 
n ot on ly in the a ct of con s ci ou sn e s s  b u t  a l s o  in t h e  phy s i ca l  s en s e  
matters very much for Ingarden 's whole phi l os ophi ca l  v iew. An act i on 
i s  f or h im an expre s s i on of human freed om .  The und e r t ak ing o f  an  
a ct i on and  i t s  fu l f i l lment  g ive  e v i d e n ce of a pe r s on ' s  d e t erm ined 
impact up on the environment ,  of her/his  being "d i fferent": an a ct ing 
pe r s on is i n  s om e  s en s e s  opp os ed t o  h e r / h i s  s u r r ound i n g s .  S im u l ­
t an e ou s l y ,  h oweve r ,  h i s / h e r  a ct i on i s  u s ua l ly turned t oward s any 
e l ement  of the s u r r ound i ng s ,  wh i ch cau s e s  the cre a t i on of new t i e s  
between the human being and the surrounding w orld. It a l s o  causes the 
s trengthening or weakening of b onds whi ch had been present before. 
At th i s  p oi n t  the p r ob l em of the ££!!.!.b i .!!!Y of r ea l i z a t i on on 
the level of empirical being of freedom whi ch con cern s  abs olute values 
appears again. Act s ,  of whi ch the measure are abs olute value s ,  mus t  
t ran s cend the exi s t ing, "g iven" l i fe - w or l d .  And r z e j  P ol t aw s k i  p e r ­
ce ive s in thi s  s tatement first of a l l  the pos s ib i l i ty of t reat ing the 
human be i n g  a s  "the s e a r ched b ond b e tw e e n  t h e  p s y ch i c- b i ol og i ca l ­
phy s i cal  v i s ible  w orld and the world of highes t  values ;  a b ond whi ch 
m a k e s  of the s e  t w o  reg i on s  on� rea l i ty" (P ol t a w sk i ,  19 8 6 ,  55f. ; my 
tran s lati on from German) .  In such interpretat i on the idea expressed 
by Ingarden coin cides in great part with Buber's ' view on the pos i t i on 
of the human be ing t owards Finality and Non-finality. 
Neverthe l e s s ,  in thi s  attitude there is n othing that gives human 
a ct i on s  a d i fferen t ,  e x ce p t i on a l  cha r a ct e r  in com p a r i s on w i th the 
a ct i on s  wh i ch a r e  p os s ib l e  f or oth e r  b e i n g s .  I t  i s  t h e  crea t ive  
chara cter of human act i ons whi ch makes them d ifferent from a l l  other 
forms of act ivity. 
1 9 7 9 ,  14) .  
"To be  human means t o  be  creative" (Tymieniecka, 
Human cre a t ive  a ct iv i ty i s  n ot ,  t h ough,  a ct i on i n  a va cuum n or 
the b reaking  of b ond s conn e ct in g  the ind i v i d u a l  w i th t h e  rea l w o r l d  
( s imi larly, human freed om i s  not the breaking of these b onds ). Human 
creative activity goes  beyond the world a s  a phy s i ca l  phenomenon int o 
5 
a p o s s ib l e  w o rld , and h i s / h e r  cho i ce i s  a cho i ce am ong p o s s ib l e  
worlds . 
A rea l l y  f ree  a ct i on wh i ch i s  in f a ct cre a t i on m u s t be  re la t e d ,  
a s  T ym i en i e ck a  p o i n t s  out , t o  one m o re i m p o rt a n t  no t ion.  Th i s  i s  a 
telos.  In int roducing the anal ys i s  of telos w i th its t riple reference 
to the human being4 Tym ieniecka at the same t ime dea l s  w ith bonds of 
s l ightly different t ypes than those Pol tawski has talked about.  Fi rst  
of  all ,  the human being plays here the rol e  of creative agent :  "These 
bonds ,  at  the one ext reme ,  have the i r  roo t s  in Elementary Nature ,  and 
at the othe r extreme, tend toward Trans cendence , the rad i cal  Other, as 
the i r  u l t im a t e  re fe ren ce p o i n t .  T h e  emph a s i s  upon h i s  !_e l o s , t h en ,  
p l a ce s  the human be i n g  w i th in the t o t a l  e xpan s e  o f  h i s  cond i t i on" 
(Tym ieniecka, 197 9 ,  28).  
Then the ne x t  p rob l em appea rs , the  p rob l em which is conne ct ed 
w i th "the Othe r, " i . e . , the  p rob l e m  o f  d i a l ogue .  Fru it fu l  s e l f­
interpretation in existen ce postulated b y  Tym ieniecka may be creative 
and a lso compri s e  t ransempi ri cal des t iny5 i f ,  as Tym ieniecka says ,  it 
i s  a "s ea rch s h a red b y  t w o  p e rsons" ( T ym i en i e cka , 19 7 9 ,  20) . A d i a ­
logue o f  two persons ,  however, is  poss ib l e  onl y  when i t  makes a path 
fo r re a l i z in g  human cre a t i v i t y. In  ou r cre a t ive s e a rch t h e  t e l o s ,  
wh i ch i s  ou r own and , a t  t h e  s ame t im e ,  re s u l t s  from the Un iv e rs a l  
Arch i t e ctu re o f  the Co smo s  ( T ym ien i e cka ) ,  l e a d s  u s  t o  t u rn t o  t he 
othe r pe rs on , who i s  ou r pa rtne r in  t h e  d i a l ogue , ou r w i tne s s  and 
judge- -and who becomes our second self. 
The human b e ing a s  pa rtn e r, the  human b e ing a s king f o r  the a i m  
and s e n s e .o f  e x i s ten ce ,  b u t  the human be ing  w h o ,  ow ing t o  h e r/ h i s  
a ct iv i t y, i s  ab l e  t o  cho o s e  and a ccom p l i s h  g o a l s ,  s e e s  re l a t i on s  
between himself/he rs e l f  and the world  as  wel l  as  those between her­
sel f/himse lf  and othe r peop l e  in a different way. Thi s  a ct ive a t t i ­
tude towards the world,  towards Nature ,  can be also cal led a n  attitude 
of d i alogue. 
P e op l e  and the w o rl d  s h a re a re l a t i on o f  onen e s s .  Tha t  peop le 
a re regarded as  something d iffe rent from the world i s  an a rbitrary a ct 
of human beings themselves. We have made ourselves d iffe rent f rom the 
w o rl d .  We have p l a ce d  ou rs e lv e s  in a p o s i t i on d i f f e rent f rom t h e  
world , and have t ried t o  be superior i n  it .  The new tas k of people i s  
to fee l  and to b e  conscious of the onenes s  of the world. ·�a ture mus t  
change from an obje ct whi ch w e  can manage into something opposite f rom 
us , but in whi ch we part i cipate. Thi s  does not mean a romant i c  return 
t o  n a t u re in wh i ch n a t u re i s  again s een a s  an o b je ct f o r  ae s the t i c  
.purposes . • . . Nature should again be the home of human beings , and 
not ju s t  the s ou rce o f  ene rg y, food , and m a te ri a l s" (Kamp i t s ,  1981, 
330) . "Man p a rt i ci p a t e s  in both F ina li t y  and Non f ina l i t y. "  Th i s  
statement of Ma rtin Bube r  a t  the same t ime indi cates that the fulfill-
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ment  of m an 's / w oman 's be ing can be  s e en n e i t h e r  f r om a s in g l e - s ided  
orienta t i on of Nonfinality unders tood as  the aim of oneness w i th God6 
nor as  a ones ided identifica t i on with Fina l i ty. Both of these,  when 
taken separate ly ,  lead to  the degradat i on of one or the other of these 
relat i ons,  i.e. , the rela t i on between the human being and Nonfinal ity 
or t h e  re la t i on b e t ween the human b e in g  and F in a l i ty i n t o  a m ere 
sub je ct-ob ject rela t i on. The resu l t  is that the human being becomes 
an ob je ct . 
The human b e in g ,  wh o p a r t i ci p a t e s  in F in a li t y and N on f ina l i ty ,  
has a pos i t i on,  s o  t o  speak, a t  the center of the universe,  but n ot in 
the sense of cla s s i ca l  anthrop ocentrism. At the same t ime we should 
con s i d e r  Kan t 's v i e w  t h a t  the r ol e  of the human be ing in h i s /her 
r e l a t i on to the ex t e rn a l  w or ld i s  t o  "order"  that w or ld.  If  w e  are 
un i t ed w i th the w or ld ,  our s i tu a t i on is  m u ch m ore  com p l i ca t e d  than 
ph i los ophers previou s ly thought it  t o  be. We are n o  l onger spectators 
looki ng a t  the w or ld as if it were a m e re p i cture .  W e  are a l s o  no 
longer the creators of order in the world who change the world w i thout 
them s e lv e s  b e ing ch anged by the w or l d .  N or a r e  w e  a r ch i t e ct s  who 
rebui lt the wor ld a ccording t o  their  own design. We are partners of 
a ll other e lements  of the wor ld. We change the w orld and are changed 
by i t .  At the s a m e  t i m e ,  our r ole in th i s  w or l d  i s ,  or r a t h e r  s h ou l d  
b e ,  m e d i a t i on .  Me d i a t i on i s  a l s o  a k ind  of d i a logue.  The m e d i a t or 
should be able t o  dialogue with b oth s ides.  I f  then '�an parti cipates 
in b oth Finality and Nonfinality" his nature should be dialog i ca l. As 
a r e s u lt ,  the d i a log i ca l  p r i n ci p l e  s h ou l d  b e t h !:_  p r in ci p l e  of human 
existence at  a l l  i t s  levels. Thi s  i s  h ow Anna- Teresa Tymieniecka sees 
the tas k of phenomenology t oday: 
The phenomenological phi los ophy is an unprejud i ced s tudy of 
experience in i t s  ent ire range : experience being under s t ood 
a s  yie ld ing obje ct s.  Experience,  moreover, i s  approa ched in 
a s p e ci f i c  w a y ,  s u ch a way t h a t  i t  leg i t im a t i z e s  i t s e l f  
natura lly in immed iate evidence. As such i t  offers a unique 
g r ound f or p h i los op h i ca l  inqu i ry. I t s  ba s i c  cond i t i on ,  
h oweve r ,  i s  t o  leg i t im i ze  i t s  v a l i d i t y .  I n  th i s  w ay i t  
a llow s  a d i a l ogue t o  un f old a m ong v a r i ou s  ph i l os oph i e s  of 
d i fferent methodologies  and persua s i ons,  s o  that their  bas i c  
as sump t i ons and concept i ons may b e  inves t igated i n  a n  ob jec­
t ive f a sh i on.  That i s ,  in s t ead of com p a r in g  con ce p t s ,  w e  
m ay g o  b e low the i r  d i f fe r e n ce s  t o  s e ek t og e t h e r  w h a t  they 
are  m e an t  t o  gra s p. We m ay in t h i s  way com e  t o  the t hi n gs 
themselves ,  whi ch are the comm on ob je ctive of a l l  phil os o-
phy . . . ( Tym i en i e ck a ,  1 9 8 4 ,  i x ) .  
--
To com e  t o  t h i n g s  them s e lv e s  d oe s  n ot m e an n e ce s s a r i ly t h a t  we 
s h ou ld f ind  the on!:_ an� on!x t ru t h  a b ou t  them , n or t h a t  w e  w i l l  f ind 
the v e r y  t r ut h ,  the  t ru t h  as s u ch .  T o  com e  t o  t h i n g s  them s e lv e s can 
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mean to see these things from d ifferent pos i t ions and to s hare one 's 
own know ledge of them with partners  whose pos i t ion towards t he same 
th in g s  is d i f fe ren t .  In t hi s  con t e x t ,  the fo l l ow in g  remark made  by 
· the contemporary German phi losopher,  Josef S imon, may be s igni f i cant :  
"To the cu l tu r e  o f  d i a l ogue b e l o n g s  s om e  d e g r e e  o f  skep t i ci sm from 
both s ides in knowing that  the ir own convi ct ion i s  'greater'  because 
it  is  noninterchangeabl e, a l though this does not mean i t  is  truer .  To 
thi s  culture belong s the acceptance of the other's convi ct ion a s  a lso 
someone ' s  ' own. ' Th i s  r e ci p r o ca l  a cce p t an ce is  at  t he s am e  t im e  a 
pract i ca l  t r u t h .  N o t  t ru t h ,  b u t  t he oppo s i t i on b e tween f a i th in 
authority and one' s own conv i ct ion w i ll be relativized in s uch a way 
t ha t  t o  the o t h e r  w i l l  a l s o be g iven t h e  r ig ht t o  p o s s e s s  a convi c­
t ion , and thereby authority" (Simon, 1985, 57 ). 
The know l e d g e  t h a t  n o  one can p o s s e s s  the "on ly" t r u t h  i s  in my 
opinion a very good prem i s e  for dialogue ,  a premise  whi ch result s  from 
one of the basic philosophi ca l  que s tions about the poss ib i li t y  of t r ue 
know l edge o f  the w o r l d  and o f  human b e in g s , a s  b e in g  b o t h  a par t  o f  
Finality and a part of Nonfinality .  I f  such a s ingle defin i t ive truth 
is impo s s ib l e ,  then t he t r ad i t i on a l  w ay o f  t h ink ing ,  a ccord ing to 
wh i ch t o  fin� a s yn t he s i s  i s  the h i gh e s t  goa l i f  d i f fe r en ce s  i n  o ur 
knowledge of the world appear, should also  be regarded as t hat  "wrong 
train" whi ch--according to Czeslaw Milos z -- humankind took. 
F a i t h  in the p o s s ib i l i ty o f  a synthe s i s  o f  C h r i s t i a n i t y  and 
Marxism was present in the phi l osophies of many outstanding thinkers 
at  the end of the 19th and in the early 2 0th centuries ,  especial ly in 
Rus s ia and Eastern Europe. One need only consider Vladim i r  Solovyev, 
Ni cholas Berdayev, or, to some degree , Stan i s law Brzozowski and even 
Czes law Milosz. All  such attempt s  have been found wanting and their 
ini t iators became deeply d isappointed,  and as  a result took a pos ition 
o f  "e i ther-or" thereby e x clud ing the p o s s i b i l i ty of d ia l ogue . Thi s 
reject ion was rooted in their  philosoph i cal  a t t i tude ,  i . e . ,  in their 
fa i th in the e x i s t en ce of an "only" truth . One m u s t add t ha t  t hi s  
also  impl ies a faith in the s ta t i c  character o f  reality and a faith in 
the un ique  p o s i t i on o f  human b e in g s  in t hi s  r ea l i t y ,  i . e . ,  a fai th 
that the freedom of the human being res ides in the capacity for man­
ipulation of the real i ty exterior to her/him and whi ch i s  t reated by 
him/her as a set of ob je ct s ,  not as  ! partner for cooperation and co­
creat ion. Contemporary philosophy in i t s  phenomenologi cal s t ream has ,  
a s ·  this  paper show s ,  rev ised thi s  posi tion to some degree . 
From the new p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,  the  s t a t ement o f  Paul  Moj ze s  a b o ut 
the r e l a tion sh ip be tween  Chr i s t i a n i t y  and Mar x i sm s eem s t o  b e  m uch 
more rea l i s t i c  than the former views ment ioned above . Mojzes  writes :  
'�o synthe sis  i s  to be expected. Whi l e  some difference s  may be re con­
ciled and whi le the partners may reach agreemen t ,  even unanimi t y, on 
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s ome i s sues ,  the goal i s  not t o  create Chr i s t ian Marxi s t s  or Marxi s t  
Ch r i s tian s a s  a h yb r i d  o f  t h e  f u t u r e "  (M ojz e s , 198 1, 2 14 ) .  M ojze s  
p r e s e n ts a m od e l  of h ow h e  s e e s  the p r oc e s s  of c oex i s tence  and 
c ooperation of Christ ians and Marxi s t s :  
Wrong Model  
(Mojzes , 198 1, 215) 
� .... .... -t' ...... -,.,......-1..' - ..... -., - <"' -.t: ..- - - .IN r.: RAeTro�o>S'" 
t/::1: �-- --
( - - -riiFF.:RE�oiccS - - ) 
Right Model 
To reca pitulate,  the cri s i s  of We s tern cul ture , including philo­
s op h y, wh i ch h a s  been e v i d e n t  s in �e the  end of the  19 th c e n t u ry has  
changed the thinking about many basic phi l os ophical prob l em s ,  a s ,  for 
example,  the problem of the rela t i onship between human beings and the 
w or l d ,  the p r ob l em of t ru th and of f r e e d om .  A l l  th i s  h a s  p l a c e d  the 
p r ob l em of the  d i a l og i c a l  chara c t e r  of t h e  r e l a t i on b e t we e n  ind iv-
i d ua l s ,  c om mun i t i e s ,  the  human and n on - human w or l d ,  e t c . ,  
im p or t a n t  p l a c e  on the  s c a l e  of ph i l os oph i c a l  r e f l e c t i on.  
s t a n d p oin t of  th i s  n e w  ph i l os oph i c a l  task  the  p r ob l em of 
i n  a very 
F r om the 
d i a l ogue 
between Chr i s t ians and Marxis t s  a l s o  at tains new s ignificance and new 
d imen s i ons.  M oreover, the problem of d ia l ogue between Chr i s tians and 
Marx i s t s  should be seen as connected w i th the prob lem of dialogue in 
the  whole  c on t em p ora r y  w or l d ,  d i a l ogue b e t we en d i f f e r e n t  g r ou p s  of 
p e op l e ,  an exam p l e  of w h i ch i s  the  d i f f i cu l t  p r ob l e m  of d i a l ogue 
between intel lectua l s  and pol i t ics  (see: Kampit s ,  1984). Chr i s tian­
M a rx i s t  d i a l ogue f i r s t  m ov e s  f r om the p os i t i on of u t op i a  t o  that of 
nece s s i t y. Thi s  d oesn't mean, however, that man y  d ifficu l t ie s  d o  not 
re m a in on a p r a c t i c a l  l eve l ,  wh i ch m ig h t  even m a k e  th i s  d i a l ogue 
impos s ible. In m y  opini on ,  the rem oval of the s e  d i fficu l t ies  should 
be one of the m os t  important tasks for intel lectuals  from both s ides ,  
as  well  as  for othe .r s .  
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Endnotes 
1I hav e w r i t t en e l sewhere  more abou t t h i s  prob l e m .  S e e  b ib ­
liography . 
2In the ph i l os o ph i ca l  l anguage o f  M a r t in Bub e r ,  t h e  p rob lem i s  
presented as fol lows :  "Thi s  means that we are a t  the � t ime and in 
one w i th the f initeness of human beings obl iged to know man 's par t i ci­
p a t i on in Non f ina l i ty ,  n o t  a s  t w o  s epara t e  featu r e s ,  b u t  a s  t he 
doub l ing o f  p r o ce s s e s  in w h i ch human exi s t en ce can f i na l l y  b e  cog­
n ized. Both Final i ty and Nonfinal i ty influence him;  he par t i ci pate s  
i n  both Final i ty and Nonfina l i t y" (Buber, 197 1, 14). 
3one should think, for example,  of Durkheim' s  considerations .  
4"we may con clude t h i s  d i s cu s s i on o f  t h e  t e lo s  wh i ch p r e s id e s  
ove r t h e  ena ctmen t o f  t h e  cre a t ive  fun ct i on by s ta t ing i t s  cr uci a l  
role in three major poin t s :  
( 1) I t  a llows the human agent to break w i th his  imposed survival­
oriented patterns and advance toward the orchestration of Imagin at io 
Creatrix. Thus it opens up the exi t  from the closed horizon-of Nature 
(and of the t rans cendental circle,  for that mat ter) for spe cifi cally 
human freedom. 
( 2) Leav ing beh ind t h e  p r e e s t ab l i shed r e gu l a t ive p r i n ci p le s  o f  
the intent i on a l  s y s tem ( su b s e rv ien t t o  N a t u r e )  the cre a t ive t e lo s  
guides the origin of new forms as  fru i t s  o f  human invent i on. Thus i t  
lead s man from natural determination to crea t ive poss ib i l i t y. 
( 3) Fina lly, the creative vision offers us the much sought s ys t em 
of reference for themati s ing the preintentional d imension of the human 
functioning as its  "sub l iminal" resource s :  they appear as a s pe cific 
endowment of the  real human individual basi c  to his  human condition" 
----- -- -- --- ---- ----- --
(Tym ieniecka, 197 9 ,  17). 
5"This quest ,  w hi ch we recognize as the road to the e xperience of 
the s a cr e d ,  d o e s  not progr e s s w i thout anx. a im .  I t  revea l s · an  inn e r  
e l em e n t  o f  d ir e ct ion , i t s  v e ry own t e l o!•  • . • We can ,  i n  p a ra lle l 
a s  m u ch a s  in con t ra s t ,  ca l l  th i s  !e l £! o f  the exp r e s s i on o f  t he 
sacred , THE SOUL'S  TRANSEMPIRICAL DESTINY" (Tymieniecka,  197 9 ,  19). 
6"In the g r e a t  r e l i g ion s ,  the  un iver s e  i s  not  the p a r tn e r  o f  
rel igious communi cat ion but a t  the most a means o f  communi cation, t he 
partner being ins ide or beyond the universe" (Kel ler, 1985, 12 1). 
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